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Introduction 
 
 
A Permanent State of Sanctions? 
Proposal for a More Flexible EU Sanctions Policy toward Russia 
Sabine Fischer 
Sanctions seem to have become a permanent element in relations between the EU 
and Russia. They have contributed to curbing the war in Donbas but are not capable 
of forcing Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine and implement the Minsk agreements. 
In 2017, consensus within the EU on sanctions against Russia is more fragile than it 
has been previously. As a result, therefore, the EU needs to consider now what strategic 
steps it should take next. 
 
In recent years, sanctions have profoundly 
affected relations between the EU and 
Russia. They are an expression of the worst 
crisis in Russia’s relationship with the West 
since the end of the East-West conflict and 
reveal the extent to which the European 
security order has broken down. They are 
also part of the blocked peace process in 
Ukraine. 
The EU closely coordinated its sanctions 
policy with the Obama administration. 
The election of Donald Trump has raised 
concerns among the US’s European allies 
that Washington could withdraw from the 
Western sanction mechanism and allow it 
to collapse. There are currently no signs 
that the Trump administration is planning 
to withdraw any punitive measures. How-
ever, the sanction mechanism could un-
ravel at the European level, too, as a result 
of parliamentary and presidential elections 
in some EU Member States. 
EU sanctions against Russia 
The restrictive measures imposed by the EU 
on Russia are based on a three-stage sanc-
tion mechanism which heads of state and 
government adopted in early March 2014. 
It includes diplomatic sanctions (Level 1), 
measures, such as visa bans and asset 
freezes targeting specific individuals or 
legal entities and organisations, (Level 2) 
and economic sanctions targeting specific 
economic sectors (Level 3). 
The EU can adopt such restrictive meas-
ures based on a Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP) decision by the Council 
which occurs at the behest of the High Rep-
resentative for Foreign and Security Policy. 
A Council regulation, prepared by the EU’s 
External Action Service and the Commis-
sion, is required if assets are to be frozen 
and economic and/or financial sanctions 
imposed. Council Decisions and Council 
Regulations come into force once they are 
published in the Official Journal of the 
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European Union. The EU officially informs 
individuals and organisations affected by 
sanctions about which steps it has taken 
and why. Restrictive measures are reviewed 
at least every 12 months and extended by 
Council Decision. The Council may at any 
time decide to amend, extend, suspend or 
repeal the sanctions. 
The diplomatic measures against Russia 
(Level 1) came into force on 6 March 2014 
through the decision of the heads of state 
and government to adopt the three-stage 
plan. Since then, negotiations on a new 
partnership agreement between the EU and 
Russia have been suspended. Visa liberaliza-
tion and visa freedom are no longer being 
negotiated and EU-Russia summits are no 
longer taking place. Many thematic work-
ing groups have been suspended as well. 
In response to the annexation of Crimea, 
the EU adopted the second stage of its sanc-
tion mechanism and initially imposed visa 
bans and asset freezes on a very limited 
number of actors who were directly in-
volved in the events. By December 2014, it 
had suspended all forms of economic inter-
action with Crimea and Sevastopol. Since 
then, the two annexed territorial units have 
been both economically and politically 
isolated from the EU. 
The EU also imposed restrictive measures 
on individuals and organisations involved 
in the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine 
from April 2014. The list of affected actors 
has since grown to a total of 150 individu-
als and 37 organisations and includes a 
number of high-ranking Russian govern-
ment representatives and confidants of the 
Russian president. The EU finally activated 
the third stage of its sanction mechanism 
in response to the escalation of the war in 
Donbas during the summer of 2014 (the 
shooting down of passenger aircraft MH17 
in July and the invasion of regular Russian 
troops in August). It imposed an arms em-
bargo and restrictions on the trade in dual-
use goods and equipment needed for crude 
oil exploration and production. It also 
restricted access to the EU’s capital market 
for a group of Russian banks and compa-
nies. At the same time, it refrained from 
imposing more disruptive measures, for in-
stance, excluding Russia from international 
payment transactions (SWIFT). The EU re-
acted to a renewed escalation of the armed 
conflict in January 2015 by extending the 
list of sanctioned individuals but did not 
adopt new economic sanctions. The restric-
tive measures it imposed as a result of the 
war in Donbas have also been gradually 
adapted in the past two years, but have not 
been tightened. They were extended every 
six months. In March 2015, the European 
Council decided to bundle the sanctions 
imposed on Donbas and agreed to make 
their suspension conditional upon the full 
implementation of the Minsk agreements 
from February 2015. The next decision on 
the Donbas sanctions is due on 31 July 2017. 
The EU coordinated closely with Washing-
ton on the form and content of its restrictive 
measures. The US list of sanctions includes 
more and more prominent individuals 
from Putin’s inner circle. US financial sanc-
tions – unlike those of the EU – also have an 
impact outside its borders. The suspension 
of US coercive measures would reduce the 
broad impact of Western sanctions. It would 
be a strong incentive for political and eco-
nomic actors within the EU who are critical 
of sanctions to further question the already 
fragile consensus in favour of sanctions. 
Russian sanctions against the EU 
In response to Western sanctions, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin ordered an import 
ban on many agricultural products from 
the EU and the US on 6 August 2014 (decree 
no. 560). For this purpose, a federal law from 
2006 authorizes ‘special economic meas-
ures’ to ensure the security of the Russian 
Federation (e.g. breaches of international 
law or hostile acts by other states against 
Russia). The import ban concerns a number 
of meat and sausage products, dairy prod-
ucts, varieties of fruit and vegetable as well 
as fish and crustaceans. Other products, 
such as baby food, certain animal products 
and live animals or lactose-free milk and 
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dairy products, were exempt from the 
embargo. These Russian sanctions have 
been extended several times since August 
2014 and also extended to third countries 
that had signed up to the EU and US sanc-
tions. The list of countries affected now 
includes Canada, Australia, Norway, 
Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, the Grand 
Duchy of Liechtenstein and Ukraine, in 
addition to the US and EU Member States. 
In May 2016, Moscow eased the ban on 
imports of beef and poultry meat as well 
as some vegetable varieties because these 
products are needed for the production of 
baby food. The Russian sanctions were last 
extended in June 2016 for the period up 
until 31 December 2017. They are a reac-
tion to the sanctions imposed by Western 
states. As a result, their suspension depends 
on the future sanctions policy of the EU, 
the US and the third-party countries in-
volved – without it being explicitly stated 
in the relevant legal documents. 
Furthermore, since March 2014, Russia 
has kept a list of 89 political actors from 
various EU Member States who are refused 
entry into the Russian Federation. Unlike 
the EU, the Russian list has neither been 
officially adopted nor published, nor has 
any reason been given as to why the poli-
ticians on the list are affected by the meas-
ure. Instead, the list was leaked to Western 
media in May 2015 after the Russian gov-
ernment had unofficially sent it to the EU. 
Whether and when the travel bans for 
those affected are cancelled is, therefore, 
even more dependent on the political will 
of leaders in Moscow than is the case with 
the Russian food embargo. 
The impact of sanctions 
The ‘impact of sanctions’ in the following 
means the overall implications of the sanc-
tions on both sides as well as on their rela-
tionship to each other. In the three years 
they have been imposed, the punitive meas-
ures have had a broad impact. The impact 
of the sanctions is not, however, identical 
with their effectiveness in the narrower 
sense, i.e. the question as to whether the 
sanctions have achieved their intended 
objectives. 
The impact of sanctions and counter-sanc-
tions on the Russian economy: The impact 
of EU sanctions corresponds to the inten-
tion of targeting individuals, organisations 
or sectors. As a result, sanctioned actors 
had to accept financial losses, such as the 
Rotenberg brothers or Gennady Timchenko, 
three influential oligarchs in Putin’s inner 
circle. Most sanctions on economic sectors 
have largely had a medium to long-term 
impact: the export ban on dual-use goods 
excludes the Russian armaments industry 
from long-term access to high-technologies 
from industrialized countries which could 
have a negative impact on Russia’s ambi-
tions to modernize its armed forces. The 
export ban on technologies in the area of 
oil exploration and production is limiting 
Russia’s ability to develop new oil fields and 
keep production levels stable. The sanctions 
have also made cooperation with Western 
energy companies more complicated. How-
ever, this is not the case for all cooperation 
projects, since contracts already concluded 
may still be implemented despite EU sanc-
tions (e.g. Nord Stream 2, Statoil coopera-
tion). The impact of these sectoral economic 
sanctions is, therefore, indirect and depend-
ent on the development of other factors. 
Consequently, some experts are question-
ing whether they will ever have an impact 
at all. 
Restrictive measures in the financial sec-
tor have the most direct influence, limiting 
access to Western financial markets for the 
affected Russian banks and companies. The 
Russian government has, therefore, had to 
give financial support to several companies 
hit hard by the sanctions. 
In 2014 and 2015, the Russian economy 
experienced an acute recession but has 
stabilized since 2016 albeit at a lower level. 
Western and Russian experts agree that 
sanctions are only one, and by no means 
the most important, reason for the reces-
sion. The oil price decline in 2014/15 had 
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a much stronger impact on the resource-
dependent Russian economy. Both Russian 
and non-Russian experts estimate the im-
pact of sanctions on the entire economy at 
0.5 to 1 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). Beyond these specific implications, 
the mere existence of the sanctions and 
the political crisis in Moscow’s relationship 
with the EU and the US have led to a gen-
eral deterioration in the business climate 
and increased risk for foreign investors. In 
the medium to long term, these trends will 
adversely affect the urgent need to modern-
ize the Russian economy. 
The consequences of the import ban 
on food from the EU, the US and other 
third-party countries were ambiguous for 
the Russian economy. On the one hand, in 
2014/15, this measure led to a massive in-
crease in food prices (up to 50 percent for 
some product groups) and pushed up infla-
tion. This, and the disappearance of coveted 
goods from supermarket shelves, had a 
direct negative effect on Russian consum-
ers. On the other hand, the Russian agri-
cultural sector benefited from the absence 
of often higher-quality Western goods and 
was the only economic sector to grow in 
the 2014/15 recession. 
The Russian political leadership coun-
tered the impact of sanctions with a pack-
age of measures. As mentioned previously, 
companies approaching insolvency were 
given support in the form of financial aid 
and large-scale public contracts enabling 
them to compensate for losses incurred 
due to the sanctions. From 2014 onwards, 
Russia also tried to rapidly intensify its 
economic relations with China – with mod-
erate success. Moscow is now working even 
more resolutely to strengthen the role of 
the state in its economy and is yet more 
relentless in its drive for protectionism and 
import substitution. 
Impact of sanctions on the economic situa-
tion in the EU: The economies of EU Mem-
ber States are affected by the mutual sanc-
tions in three respects. Firstly, the EU’s 
restrictive measures prevent certain inter-
actions in the armaments industry, in high 
technology and the energy sector. Secondly, 
some Member States have suffered declines 
in their agricultural exports due to the Rus-
sian import ban. And thirdly, the recession 
and the concomitant weakening of Russian 
purchasing power had a negative impact on 
EU companies active in Russia. Calculations 
by economists conclude that the sanctions 
will have only a very limited long-term im-
pact on the EU economy as a whole (consid-
erably below 0.5 percent of GDP). However, 
the effects are distributed very unevenly 
due to varying degrees of economic inter-
dependency. As Russia’s most important 
European trading partner, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, for example, is hardest 
hit by the EU sanctions. France had to halt 
the sale of two Mistral-class helicopter car-
riers. The French banking sector is exposed 
to risks from particularly high lending to 
Russian companies. Others, mostly Eastern 
Central European countries and Finland, 
are strongly affected by the Russian agri-
cultural embargo. 
The negative consequences of sanctions 
are not existential for EU Member States, 
but they cannot be ignored in view of the 
already tense economic situation in the EU. 
Back in 2014, the Commission launched a 
series of steps to counter the negative ef-
fects. These included measures to stabilize 
the EU’s agricultural market and attempts 
to open up new markets within the EU or 
in third countries. Therefore, re-focussing 
on other markets, such as Belarus, could 
largely offset Russian market losses. 
In 2014, the EU sanctions were deliber-
ately designed in such a way as to not en-
danger its close energy relations with Rus-
sia in the medium to long term, especially 
in the natural gas sector. However, efforts 
to diversify EU natural gas imports were 
in place long before the outbreak of the 
Ukraine crisis. The primary and secondary 
implications of the sanctions imposed in 
2014 have lead to unbundling tendencies 
in various sectors on the EU side. 
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The effectiveness of sanctions in 
the EU-Russia relationship 
When international actors impose sanctions 
they usually want to punish the action of 
another actor and make it change its poli-
cies. They can use sanctions in a variety of 
ways to either coerce their counterpart to 
change their course of action against their 
explicit will or convince them of the mean-
ingfulness of political reorientation. They 
can also use sanctions to send a signal to 
a counterpart, but also to other target 
groups, such as their own citizens or the 
international community. The harshness 
of the punitive measure depends on the 
intention (to coerce, convince or send a 
signal). However, the relative strength of 
the sanctioned actor also determines which 
of the three options the sanctioning party 
choses. 
The EU restrictive measures were adopt-
ed against Russia in 2014 “with a view to in-
creasing the costs of Russia’s actions to 
undermine Ukraine’s territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence and to pro-
moting a peaceful settlement of the crisis”. 
The decisions to establish the sanction 
mechanism and to activate the three levels 
were each taken in phases as the conflict 
escalated. Their aim was to de-escalate the 
war but also to create a political environ-
ment in which it would be possible to 
peacefully resolve the conflict and restore 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Ukraine. 
The EU responded to the annexation of 
Crimea with weak sanctions. EU decision-
makers were surprised by the rapid speed 
of developments there. In the spring of 
2014, a number of Member States, includ-
ing Germany, were still rejecting full imple-
mentation of the three-tier sanctions 
mechanism. As a result, the EU’s response 
was to signal their disapproval of Russian 
(and also Ukrainian) policy. The additional 
costs incurred by the sanctions had no 
impact on Moscow’s decision to annex 
Crimea and to persist with this action. 
A different assessment can be made of 
the effectiveness of Western sanctions with 
regard to the escalation of the war in East-
ern Ukraine. The decision to fully activate 
the sanctions mechanism and impose sec-
toral economic measures may well have 
influenced the course of the armed conflict 
in Donbas. After September 2014, it did 
not expand much beyond the conflict line 
established during the Minsk negotiations. 
Russia re-calibrated its support for the sepa-
ratists and disempowered the most radical 
actors among them. The chronology of 
the conflict suggests that the imposition 
of painful economic measures, which made 
the threat of more serious measures cred-
ible, restricted Moscow’s actions and curbed 
further escalation of the war. The simulta-
neous debate taking place in the West on 
possible military support for the Ukrainian 
army may have played a role here. The sanc-
tions were, therefore, quite effective. They 
convinced Russia of the necessity to mod-
erate their acts of war, without having been 
able to force them to end the conflict com-
pletely. 
The sanctions have not changed the basic 
orientation of Russia’s policy on Ukraine 
which is to maintain influence through 
controlled instability. The annexation of 
Crimea has become such an important part 
of the Russian identity discourse that the 
political leadership cannot reverse it with-
out endangering itself. A large majority of 
the Russian population continue to support 
the government’s position on Ukraine. In 
addition, hopes that targeted restrictive 
measures could lead to dissent and resist-
ance in the ranks of the political and eco-
nomic elite have not come to fruition. The 
EU has not had access to Russian society 
and its elite for some years which would 
be a requirement for exerting any influence 
of this kind. The majority of Russians still 
believe the West bears full responsibility 
for the crisis; approval ratings for foreign 
policy and for the president remain high. 
The European Council has ‘misappropri-
ated’ the sanctions in its package solution 
from March 2015. Their goal is no longer 
restricted to de-escalation but is aimed at 
fully implementing the military and politi-
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cal provisions negotiated in Minsk. The 
Minsk process, on the other hand, has been 
blocked since 2015 because the parties are 
calling for contrary sequencing of the Minsk 
agreements. Russia (with the separatists) 
insists that the political provisions must 
be implemented before the military pro-
visions, while Kiev is demanding security 
and control over its borders before it can or 
will implement the political provisions. The 
sanctions have become part of this blockade. 
They do not offer Moscow any incentive 
to change their policies. Furthermore, the 
‘package solution’ makes the lifting of 
sanctions also dependent on Kiev’s policies. 
Russia has repeatedly complained that while 
it suffers from the sanctions, it is actually 
Ukraine that is not fulfilling its obligations 
under the Minsk agreements. 
Russia has hitherto been less successful with 
its sanctions than the EU and/or Western 
actors. EU Member States have decided to 
continue the sanctions at regular intervals 
since 2014. It should be pointed out that 
there is no causal link between the extent 
to which a Member State is affected by the 
mutual sanctions and its critical attitude to 
sanctions: of those Member States in favour 
of a severe course of sanctions, Poland, 
the three Baltic republics and the Federal 
Republic of Germany are the hardest hit 
economically. 
The debate on punitive measures against 
Russia has already taken several turns. The 
consensus on sanctions was first put to the 
test when Russia broke out of its internatio-
nal isolation for the first time in the autumn 
of 2015 with its military intervention in 
Syria and the EU was, simultaneously, un-
der pressure from the increasing number of 
refugees. One year later, on the other hand, 
it was the Russian-Syrian bombardment of 
Aleppo that prevented a critical discussion 
of sanctions at EU level. 
While the impact of the ‘Trump factor’ is 
as yet unknown, shifting forces in favour of 
populist and anti-EU movements in impor-
tant elections in European countries could 
jeopardize the consensus on sanctions 
throughout the course of the year. Given 
the key role that cooperation between 
Berlin and Paris has played and still plays 
in both negotiating sanctions and in the 
Minsk Process, the acid test in this context 
could be the presidential election in France. 
Contrary to reducing Western opportu-
nities to influence Russian opinion-shaping 
and decision-making processes, Russia, for 
its part, is currently influencing political 
developments in EU Member States through 
various means. If, in the upcoming elec-
tions, political forces succeed in removing 
the basis for the sanctions mechanism by 
withdrawing their consent, Russia’s overall 
strategy (counter-sanctions and political 
influence) will have proved successful at a 
stroke. 
What next? 
EU sanctions against Russia were not in-
effective as is repeatedly claimed. In view of 
Western efforts to end the crisis in Ukraine, 
they should be viewed as a partial success 
because they have 
 expressed the EU’s protest at Russia’s vio-
lations of international law; 
 helped curb armed conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine in the summer/autumn of 2014 
and spring of 2015; 
 helped prevent Russia and the separat-
ists from expanding the war. 
However, the sanctions did not 
 reverse the annexation of Crimea; 
 end the war in Donbas; 
 lead to full implementation of the Minsk 
agreements. 
They also had some unintended effects. 
For example, processed accordingly by the 
Russian state media propaganda machine, 
they contributed to consolidating the 
authoritarian Russian regime. The coinci-
dental timing of sanctions and the decline 
of the oil price and the economic crisis in 
2014/15 reinforced the impression among 
the Russian population that the sanctions 
were aimed at worsening their socio-eco-
nomic situation. In addition, compensa-
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tion, the reorientation of foreign trade and, 
in part, efforts to circumvent the sanctions 
on both sides, have led to a certain habitu-
ation effect in bilateral economic relations. 
In view of the general weakness of the Rus-
sian economy, it is also questionable whether 
an end to the sanctions would rapidly 
restore economic relations to levels before 
2014. In turn, this reduces the already low 
incentive capacity of the sanctions. 
The Western consensus on sanctions ap-
pears to be less stable in early 2017 than in 
previous years. The worst conceivable sce-
nario is an uncontrolled collapse because 
EU Member States can no longer agree on 
the sanctions and transatlantic cooperation 
fails. This course of events is very likely if 
Marine Le Pen wins the French presidential 
election. However, even if the Front Natio-
nal does not win elections in France, a 
development of this nature cannot be ruled 
out. It should be prevented in all circum-
stances because it would 
 revive uncertainty and the risk of esca-
lation in Eastern Ukraine; 
 confirm to Russia that there is sufficient 
scope for a policy of military influence 
in its neighbourhood; 
 signal to all parties that the EU is inca-
pable of taking action. 
To date, Russia has not given the West 
any reason to consider lifting sanctions. 
No change to Russia’s Crimean policy is ex-
pected under the current political leader-
ship in Moscow. The Crimea sanctions 
should, therefore, be maintained in any 
event. 
With regard to Donbas, consideration 
should be given to unbundling the sanc-
tions package and linking the gradual 
lifting of sanctions to the implementation 
of security provisions. This applies in par-
ticular to the ceasefire (item 1), the with-
drawal of heavy weapons (item 2), effective 
monitoring and verification of the ceasefire 
regime by the OSCE (item 3), guaranteeing 
access for humanitarian aid (item 7) and 
the withdrawal of foreign armed groups 
(item 10). The EU could provide additional 
incentives for implementation alongside 
the gradual lifting of sanctions, including 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) resuming its activities 
in Russia. 
At the same time, pressure on the 
Ukrainian side would have to be increased 
considerably in order for it to meet its 
security provisions. The EU would have to 
make it more clear to Ukraine than it has in 
the past that it should also expect negative 
consequences if it were to contravene these 
provisions or even escalate the conflict. The 
EU should urge the Ukrainian leadership to 
set up a coherent reconstruction pro-
gramme for the destroyed parts of the 
Donbas, and also support it generously. In 
addition, Kiev urgently needs to abandon 
its current policy of socio-economically 
isolating separatist-controlled areas. 
This last point is particularly important. 
Unresolved conflicts over Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Kara-
bakh in the last 25 years have shown that 
implementing ceasefires and, at the same 
time, politically, economically and socially 
partitioning the conflict parties leads to the 
formation of de facto states and decades-
long blockades of peace processes. It is only 
now that attempts are being made to break 
down the isolation of the conflict areas and 
counteract this highly advanced develop-
ment through a policy of engagement and 
non-recognition. The EU should now insist 
that this mistake is not repeated in Donbas. 
From a Russian perspective and from the 
perspective of critics of moderate sanctions 
in the EU, the proposed flexibility would 
make an end to the sanctions more tangible 
and this end would no longer depend on 
Kiev implementing the political provisions. 
At the same time, Ukraine’s comprehen-
sible need for greater security could be 
taken into account before political obliga-
tions are met. The Minsk negotiations and 
the accompanying international process 
(Normandy format) should certainly con-
tinue and be used to discuss further politi-
cal steps. 
The sanctions have proved to be an effec-
tive means of curbing the war in Donbas. 
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They should be linked to this objective 
again. The prospects of this approach being 
successful also depend on the political will 
of the conflict parties. This will is not cur-
rently present on either side. Sanctions 
will, therefore, have to remain a permanent 
condition for the time being. However, with 
the step proposed here, the EU would be 
proactively demonstrating its willingness 
to be more flexible in its approach. It would, 
therefore, be better prepared for a future 
turning point where the conflict parties 
signal genuine interest in a sustainable 
solution to the conflict. 
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